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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to empirically assess the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of banks Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in eight East Asian countries over 
the 1997-2003 period. M&As are classified according to the status of entity, the time period 
of the deal and the maturity of the banking system. A Bivariate GARCH model is used to 
estimate abnormal returns taking beta conditional variability into account. We find that the 
market reacts negatively to the M&As that occurred during the crisis period (1997-2000) and 
in the less mature banking systems (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and 
Thailand).  
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1. Introduction 
The move towards globalization entailed some risk that was recognized only upon the 
onset of the 1997 Asian crisis. Several papers have analysed the causes and consequences of 
the crisis from different perspectives. For some authors, weak fundamentals were the main 
cause of the crisis while others place more weight on the radical shift in expectations as the 
primary trigger of the crisis
1
. Beside these explanations that highlight the role of 
macroeconomic characteristics other studies explore the microeconomic factors of this 
financial instability
2
. During this crisis, banking institutions came under severe stress. Asian 
governments faced a trade-off between leaving distressed banks open rather than closing them. 
This public choice depends on the importance of the particular financial institution to the local 
economy and its potential systemic impact on the rest of the financial system. Therefore, 
some governments decided to avoid closure through recapitalization, guarantees of bank 
liabilities, liquidity support, regulatory forbearance and tax preferences. These direct supports 
were also accompanied by indirect supports, such as government-led consolidations. Indeed, 
domestic mergers and takeovers often constitute the least costly way of restructuring the 
banking system. But, unlike in mature systems where market forces play the dominant role in 
the incentives to consolidate, some Asian governments were instrumental in the consolidation 
efforts. They encouraged or even forced banking institutions to merge (Hawkins and Turner 
(1999), Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001), Gelos and Roldós (2004)). Thus, since the 1997 crisis, 
the East Asian countries have experienced an unprecedented level of consolidation. 
The objective of this study is to examine the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of bank Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in eight East Asian countries 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) 
from 1997 to 2003. For purposes of this study, we use Hawkins and Mihaljek’s (2001) 
classification to distinguish “more mature” banking systems where M&As are mainly market 
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driven, against “less mature” ones where government-led M&As proliferate. Hence M&As in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are market driven while those on the remaining countries 
are effectively classified as government-led. The existing studies that examine the effects of 
financial restructuring announcement on the value of bank stocks mainly focus on direct 
supports policies (Kho and Stulz (2000), Kang et al. (2001), Klingbiel et al. (2001), Lau and 
McInish (2003)). We examine here the market expectations in terms of return.   
Most of the available studies on M&As in the banking sector concern the US and 
Europe (Hannan and Wolken (1989), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Pilloff and Santomero 
(1998), Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Delong (2001), Lepetit et al. (2004)). These studies 
focus on the achievement of performance gains attributable to economies of scale and scope, 
cost reduction, increased market power and reduced earning volatility due to consolidation. 
These expected performance gains should be positively valued by the market. By contrast, the 
bank consolidations in East Asia after the crisis were not mainly conducted for efficiency 
considerations but were primarily encouraged to strengthen the banking system. Here, 
strengthening means having a few banks with a large capital base. Indeed, some of the 
acquiring banks are paired off with banks in distress. In this case, one will not necessarily 
expect a positive value effect for the acquiring banks. Instead, such a merger should imply an 
increase in risk for the acquirer banks if the target is about to fail or has a bad portfolio. On 
the other hand, the target should benefit from a decrease in risk. Thus, whether the process of 
government-led M&As stabilizes the financial system remains an open question. 
The impact of M&As on bank return is studied using a framework developed by 
Frame and Lastrapes (1998). Abnormal returns are modelled as a Bivariate GARCH process 
to control for time-varying beta volatility. Although the use of the market model to estimate 
abnormal returns has a long standing, a growing body of evidence exists which suggests that 
both individual stock and portfolio betas are time-varying (see Fabozzi and Francis (1978), 
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Bos and Newbold (1984)). Explicitly modelling time varying betas avoids the problem of 
inaccurate estimates of abnormal returns induced by a misspecification of beta's properties. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the banking consolidation 
process that took place after the 1997 crisis in 8 East Asian countries (Indonesia, Hong-Kong, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South-Korea, Taiwan and Thailand). Section 3 presents the 
sample design and the data sources on East Asian banks M&As. Section 4 explains how 
abnormal returns are computed using a Bivariate GARCH scheme. Section 5 presents the 
results and section 6 concludes.  
2. Post-Asian crisis banking consolidation process 
Since the 1997 crisis, banks M&As in the East Asian countries have taken place at 
record levels. According to Securities Data Corporation (SDC), the total number of deals was 
39 over the period 1990-1996 and jumped to 140 deals for the 1997-2003 period. Table 1 
shows that this sharp increase occurred mainly during the three years following the crisis.  
 
Table 1. Number of M&As for the banking industry in 8 East Asian countries, 1990-2003 
Country Number of M&As 
before the crisis 
1990-1996 
Number of M&As after the crisis 
1997-2003 
1997-2000 2001-2003 Total 
Hong-Kong 12 12 7 19 
Indonesia 3 7 3 10 
Malaysia 8 14 4 18 
Philippines 7 24 9 33 
Singapore 4 4 9 13 
South Korea 2 14 6 20 
Taiwan 3 5 8 13 
Thailand 0 14 0 14 
Total 39 94 46 140 
Data sources: Thomson Financial Securities Data Mergers and Acquisitions Database 
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As stated in the introduction, the M&As that took place in western and more mature 
economies can be distinguished from those that occurred in East Asian economies after the 
1997 crisis. Gelos and Roldós (2004) list globalization, technological developments and 
regulation as the main driving forces of M&As in mature banking systems. While these may 
also be present in some East Asian countries, M&As were mainly driven by government 
desires to avoid the closure of distressed banks. As Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) state, two 
groups of countries can be distinguished in this banking consolidation process.  
In the emerging economies with more mature banking systems (Hong-Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan), the governments need both to foster the development of the major 
domestic banks and to help them to compete in the region against foreign banks. As reported 
by Carse (2001), Hong-Kong banks remained profitable even during the Asian crisis. 
Financial distress was therefore not a driving force for M&As. In order to compete with 
foreign banks, a number of local banks merged. The Singapore government has been more 
pro-active in the banking consolidation process. Indeed, government induced local banks to 
strengthen themselves by raising disclosure and corporate governance standards to 
international norms.  
In the emerging economies with less mature banking systems (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand), M&As were mainly government-led. Two arguments 
are used to justify such consolidation process. Firstly, these interventions provide a way for 
distressed banks, which remain unattractive to potential buyers, to restore their financial 
viability. Secondly, such interventions may still be more cost-effective than a government 
bailout or takeover. Korean and Malaysian governments were more active in the restructuring 
of the financial system through bank consolidation as compared to the Philippines and 
Thailand where the process was partially driven by market forces. Korea successfully reduced 
the number of banks from 27 prior to the 1997 crisis to 17 by the beginning of 2000 through 
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government encouraged consolidation: 9 banks merged to form 4 successor banks in 1999 and 
2 merged to form one bank in July 2000. In Malaysia, authorities announced a plan in 
September 1999 for 54 local banks and finance companies to merge into 6 large groups 
(Gelos and Roldós, (2004)). In October, these banks and finance companies were allowed to 
decide voluntarily with whom to merge. This was probably one of the most successful 
government-led bank consolidation efforts. Other governments have been less successful in 
inducing mergers and consolidations. Since 1997, 17 private banks and 4 state banks have 
been involved in 2 mandatory government-sponsored mergers and 3 voluntary mergers in 
Indonesia. The first government-sponsored mergers took place in July 1999 (4 distressed state 
banks were merged) and the second one was implemented in June 2000 (9 small banks were 
consolidated into 1 private bank). 
 
3.  Data, sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 We examine M&As in 8 East Asian countries (Hong-Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) announced between January 1 
1997 and December 31 2003 where both of the partners are credit institutions
3
. The Thomson 
Financial Securities Data Merger and Acquisition Database lists 140 such deals (see Table 1 
for more details). We use only those M&As where the acquirer and/or the target’s stock is 
publicly traded and daily stock return data are available on a continuous basis. The data 
source for the individual banks’ returns as well as home market index is Datastream 
International
4
. The distinction between a merger and an acquisition is somewhat vague. A 
merger is often defined as a transaction where one entity is combined with another so that at 
least one initial entity loses its distinct identity. An acquisition is often considered as a 
transaction where one firm purchases a controlling stake of another firm without combining 
the assets of the firms involved. In this study the distinction is not made and the terms merger 
and acquisition are used interchangeably to refer to transactions involving the combination of 
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two independent firms to form one entity. This study limits itself to transactions for which the 
acquirer gets to own at least 25% of the target after the deal
5
. Moreover, only completed 
operations are considered
6
. Thus, out of the 140 M&As listed by Thomson Financial 
Securities Data Merger and Acquisition Database, a sample of 90 deals is obtained. Banks 
with discontinuously traded stocks around the event are excluded. In the remaining sample, 
there are 16 banks which experienced at least two M&As during the considered period. Hence, 
the study only includes banks with multiple events for which at least a 160 day no break 
estimation window is available. The final data set used in the empirical analysis after all these 
exclusions includes 71 deals involving 48 banks.  
Three criteria are used to classify our panel of M&As. The first criterion is the status 
of the entity, target or acquirer, traditionally used in such studies. Following the analysis of 
Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) on the banking consolidation process in emerging countries, 
two specific criteria related to the Asian crisis are also used: the time period of the deal and 
the maturity of the banking system. As stated by these authors, the government-led M&As 
occurred mostly during the 1997-2000 period. Thus, we distinguish two sub periods: the crisis 
period (1997-2000) and the post crisis period (2001-2003). Concerning the maturity of the 
banking system, we previously highlighted that consolidation has been predominantly a way 
of resolving problems of financial distress in the less mature banking systems (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand), whereas M&As are essentially market 
driven in the more mature banking systems (Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan). In our 
sample, 45% of the deals concern the countries with a less mature banking system and 60% of 
the deals occurred during the crisis period. 
Financial ratios, which provide information on individual bank characteristics, are 
computed using annual financial statements obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. 
Information is available for all the 48 banks considered in our analysis. We consider: (i) 
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profitability defined by the return on assets (ROA); (ii) capital requirement as measured by 
the total capital ratio (TCR); (iii) asset quality represented by the ratio of non performing 
loans to total loans (NPL); (iv) management quality defined by the ratio of operating expenses 
to total revenue often called the inefficiency ratio (INEFF); (v) size as measured by the 
logarithm of total assets (SIZE). For the 71 deals in our sample, we compute for each bank the 
mean of each variable over the two years before the deal. Table 2 shows summary statistics 
for sub-samples based on the three criteria defined above. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of banks’ financial statement before the deal 
Mean (%) ROA TCR NPL INEFF SIZE 
Full sample (N=71) -0.096 15.337 14.322 56.75 15.972 
      
Entity Status      
          Target (N=35) -0.651 12.852 19.851 67.54 15.951 
Acquirer (N=36) 0.557 18.685 9.253 43.07 15.996 
 Mean Test: t-statistic -2,079** -5,860** 5,965** 2,057** -0,121 
      
Time period of the deal      
Crisis period (N=43) -0,396 15,079 13,232 58,625 15,674 
Post crisis period (N=28) 0,365 15,571 15,737 53,827 16,431 
         Mean Test: t-statistic -1,255 -0,218 -0,427 0,383 -2,110** 
      
Maturity of the banking system     
More mature (N=26) 0.719 17.037 9.144 49.058 15.968 
Less mature (N=45) -0.557 13.932 19.067 60.702 15.974 
Mean Test: t-statistic 2,118** 1,976** -2,818** -4.289** -0.018 
Note: ROA=the return on assets; TCR=the total capital ratio; NPL=the ratio of non performing loans to total 
assets; INEFF=the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue; SIZE=the logarithm of the total assets. These 
variables are calculated on average for the 2 years before the deal.  
More mature banking system are Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; Less mature banking system are Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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On average, the whole sample presents a negative profitability before the deal, mainly 
due to the weakness of target banks compared to the acquired banks. This weakness is 
highlighted by three factors. Firstly, the ROA is on average negative and significantly lower 
for target banks compare to acquirer banks. Secondly, target banks have total capital ratios 
significantly lower and non-performing loan (NPL) ratios greater than acquirer banks. Their 
NPLs represent around 20% of total loans. Thirdly, operating expenses are particularly high 
for target banks and lead to a higher inefficiency. This fragility of target banks supports the 
government-led consolidation effort to strengthen capital adequacy and the financial viability 
of many banks affected by the 1997-1998 crisis. Indeed, healthier banks are being induced to 
merge through government buyouts of NPLs and the prospect of increasing their market share.  
Moreover, banks’ published accounts suggest substantial differences in efficiency and 
profitability across countries according to the maturity of their banking system. Table 2 shows 
that banks in mature banking systems show positive and significantly higher profits and 
capital ratios than those in less mature banking systems. Moreover, the non-performing loans 
and the inefficiency ratios are significantly higher for the less mature banking systems.  
 
4. Methodology  
We consider the market reaction to M&As announcement occurred after the 1997 
crisis. Then, the event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal stock market returns 
around the event day D, which is the announcement date. Abnormal returns (AR) are defined 
as the daily realised return for each firm i, net of the estimated expected returns for the period 
around a given event date (the event window). Traditionally, the standard market model is 
used to calculate abnormal returns. This methodology is severely limited by the assumption of 
a constant beta over the estimation period. We apply here a methodology developed by Frame 
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and Lastrapes (1998) based on a Bivariate GARCH which allows beta to be time-varying. 
This method is described by the following equations: 
 (1) rit = ai1 + ai2 ri t-1 + uit     
 (2) rm t = am1 + am2 rm t-1 + umt  
 (3) hiit = ci1 + ci2 ui t-1
2
 + ci3 hi t-1  
 (4) hmmt = cm1 + cm2 um t-1
2
 + cm3 hm t-1  
 (5) imt im iit mmth c h .h   
where rit and rmt are the expected returns on security i and market benchmark. Equations (1) 
and (2) define the average returns on security i and market index. Equations (3) and (4) define 
the conditional variances of rit and rmt. Equation (5) defines the conditional covariance. The 
optimised log likelihood function is: 
 (6) Log Lt = – 0.5 Log |Ht| - 0.5 u’t Ht
-1
 ut      
where |Ht| is the determinant of the matrix Ht  with  Ht = 
ii t imt
imt mmt
h h
h h
 
 
 
 , and u’t = [uit, umt]. 
 Equilibrium return ri T+k
*
 of security i at time (T+k) of the event window is defined as 
a function of: (i) the anticipation at time T of beta coefficient, denoted  i T+k ; (ii) the actual 
return on the market at time (T+k), rm T+k: 
   (7)      ri T+k
*
 = E (ri T+k | IT, rm T+k) = E(ri T+k | IT) + 
imT k T
mmT k T
E(h | I )
E(h | I )


 (rm T+k – E(rm T+k | IT)) 
where IT is the information available at time T and 
imT k T
mmT k T
E(h | I )
E(h | I )


 is the expected value of  
 i T+k at time T. 
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Abnormal return at time (T+k) is defined as the difference between the actual return 
and the equilibrium return: 
 (8)                     ARi T+k = ri T+k – ri T+k
*
                                                               
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on the event window [T+1, T+k] is: 
 (8’)                   
k
i T k i T j
j 1
CAR AR
 

                                                                  
For each bank, the model (1) to (5) is first estimated on a pre-event window. The 
length of this pre-event window is different according to the event considered. It ranges from 
160 to 300 days. Cumulative abnormal returns are then evaluated over two-tailed symmetric 
event windows: [D – J, D + J], for J = 7, 15 where D is the event day.  
Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for each of these event windows and for 
each bank i. The null hypothesis that there is no cumulative abnormal returns for the bank i 
over the entire event window (CARi T+k = 0) is tested with a parametric test. Following Frame 
and Lastrapes (1998), we define the parametric statistic T1i, which is the standardised 
cumulative abnormal returns for the bank i on the event window [T+1, T+k] as: 
T1i = 
iT k
iT k T m
CAR
Var (CAR | I ,{r })

  ,  
 
Under the null hypothesis (no abnormal returns), T1i is asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal variable. 
 
On the other hand, the null hypothesis that there are no abnormal returns for the entire 
bank sample and over the entire event window is tested. We use the statistic defined by 
Lepetit et al (2004): 
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  T2 = 
SCAR
SCAR
s
 = 
 
N
i U
i 1
2N
i U
i 1
1
SCAR
N
1
SCAR SCAR
N(N 1)






 
where N is the number of banks in the sample, SCARiU is the standardised cumulative 
abnormal return for bank i at the upper bound U of the event window and SCAR  is the cross 
section mean of the different SCARiU. Under the null hypothesis, T2 is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal variable
7
. 
 
5. Results 
Abnormal return estimations are carried out using both [-7, +7] and [-15, +15] event 
windows, and sampling M&As’ according to the status of the entity, the time period of the 
deal and the maturity of the banking system. Table 3A presents the results. According to T2 
statistic values, cumulative abnormal returns are negative and significant for the whole 
sample, but only at the 10% level. Thus, on average, Asian M&As in the banking industry 
lead to significant decrease in overall value. This result is not consistent with the findings of 
most event studies carried out for the U.S. (Pilloff and Santomero (1998), Delong (2001)) and 
the European banking markets (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Lepetit et al. (2004)). 
But the market expects a negative value effect only for few M&As. Indeed, the statistic T1 
statistics show that less than 10% of the deals lead to, individually, significant negative 
abnormal returns.  
The three classification criteria (entity status, time period of the deal, maturity of the 
banking system) allow us to identify M&As for which the market reacts negatively and makes 
a distinction between the different types of deal. Figure 1 graphically shows the CARs 
classified according to these classification criteria. and for a 7-day symmetric event window. 
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Firstly, Table 3A and Figure 1 show that the market reacts negatively to M&As 
occurred during the crisis period (1997-2000), when they were often used to solve financial 
distress. Moreover, M&As occurred after the crisis period (2001-2003), when market forces 
play a dominant role (scale and scope economies, cost reductions, increased market power,...), 
does not present a positive and significant abnormal returns as we can expect. Indeed, as 
M&As may be mostly driven by market forces during this period, the expected performance 
should be then positively valued by the market.  
Secondly, the market does not differentiate between the target and the acquirer. There 
are no significant abnormal returns for both of them. This result is not consistent with the 
findings of Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Delong (2001), Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
and Lepetit et al. (2004), who obtain significant positive abnormal returns for the target 
group. Such a result can be explained by efficiency gains (X-efficiency improvement, 
replacement of inefficient managers,...). 
Thirdly, the market makes a distinction between the deals according to the maturity of 
the banking system. Table 3A and Figures 1 show that, there is a significant and negative 
market reaction to M&As in the less mature banking systems as expected. Moreover,      
Table 3B shows that this negative reaction of the stock market concerns deals which occurred 
during the crisis period only. Indeed M&As were mainly driven by government to solve the 
financial distress. On the contrary, there is a positive market reaction to M&As in the more 
mature banking systems, but not significant for deals which took place during or after the 
crisis period. 
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Table 3A. Sign and significance of abnormal returns 
    
Sample Event window T2 value Number of  significant T1i value 
   Positive Negative 
Full sample [-7, +7] -1,898* 2 6 
(N = 71) [-15, +15] -0,161 3 5 
Entity status     
Target [-7, +7] -1,629 2 3 
(N = 35) [-15, +15] -0,306 3 4 
     
Acquirer [-7, +7] -0,989 0 3 
(N = 36) [-15, +15] 0,201 0 1 
Time period of the deal     
Crisis period [-7, +7] -2,471** 0 4 
(N = 43) [-15, +15] -1,234 1 4 
     
Post crisis period [-7, +7] -0,177 2 2 
(N = 28) [-15, +15] 1,210 2 1 
Maturity of the banking system     
More mature [-7, +7] 0,038 2 1 
(N = 26) [-15, +15] 1,277 2 0 
     
Less mature  [-7, +7] -2,363** 0 5 
(N = 45) [-15, +15] -0,809 1 5 
** and * indicate significance respectively at the 5% and 10% levels. T1i  is the standardised cumulative 
abnormal returns for the bank i on the event window. T2  is the standardised cumulative abnormal returns for the 
entire bank sample and over on the event window.  
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Table 3B. Sign and significance of abnormal returns according to the maturity of the banking 
system and the time period of the deal. 
    
Sample Event window T2 value Number of  significant T1i value 
   Positive Negative 
Crisis period     
Less mature banking system     
(N = 36) [-7, +7] -2.537** 0 4 
 [-15, +15] -0,646 0 1 
More mature banking system     
(N = 7) [-7, +7] 0.082 0 0 
 [-15, +15] 0.583 1 1 
Post crisis period     
Less mature banking system     
(N = 9) [-7, +7] 0.604 1 1 
 [-15, +15] -0.024 1 1 
More mature banking system     
(N = 19) [-7, +7] 0.462 2 2 
 [-15, +15] 1.440 1 0 
** and * indicate significance respectively at the 5% and 10% levels. T1i  is the standardised cumulative 
abnormal returns for the bank i on the event window. T2  is the standardised cumulative abnormal returns for the 
entire bank sample and over on the event window.  
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Figure 1. Cross-sectionnal average of the CARiT+k evaluated for a 7 days symmetric event 
windows 
Entity Status 
                                                                    Target                                                                
       
 
Acquirer 
 
 
Time period of the deal 
Crisis period 
 
 
 17 
Figure 1. Cross-sectionnal average of the CARiT+k evaluated for a 7 days symmetric event 
windows 
Time period of the deal 
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More mature 
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6. Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to carry out an empirical investigation on the market 
reaction of M&As announcements in East Asian countries over the 1997-2003 period. A 
Bivariate GARCH model was used to construct abnormal returns. M&As were divided into 
several groups depending upon the entity status, the time period of the deal and the maturity 
of the banking system. 
 Our results show that there is, on average, a negative and significant decrease in value 
for banks. More precisely, the market reacts negatively to the M&As that occurred during the 
crisis period (1997-2000) and in the less mature banking system (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand), which are mainly government-led. Moreover the 
market does not differentiate between the target and the acquirer in terms of returns. Indeed 
we do not find abnormal returns for both of them.  
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1
 A representative “weak fundamentals” view of the crisis is Corsetti et al (1998) while a “changing 
expectations” perspective can be found in Radelet and Sachs (1998).  
2
 See among others Bongini et al. (2001) for a study of the microeconomic foundations of financial distress and 
Bongini et al. (2002) for an analysis of the influence of market information to assess financial fragility. 
3
 Credit institutions include commercial banks, saving banks, mutual and cooperative banks, investment banks 
and bank holdings. We use the term “banks” to refer to these credit institutions.  
4
 Datastream International General Market Indexes are used. 
5
 The 25% threshold is chosen in order to include in our sample some cross-borders M&As which occurred in 
country like Malaysia where a 30% ceiling on foreign ownership of banks is effected by law. Anyway, in our 
final sample, we have 65% of the transactions for which the acquirer gets to own at least 80% of the target and 
only 10% of the transactions for which the acquirer gets to own less than 30%.  
6
 The stock market should not react to the incomplete operations which did not lead to the creation of a new 
entity.  
7
 The T2 statistic assumes that the CARs on individual banks are uncorrelated in the cross section. Cross-
sectional dependence is likely to exist when at least some of the returns are sampled from common time periods. 
Then, the usual distributional results no longer apply and T2 will be misleading. However, as few of our 
announcement dates are on common periods, the correlation between CARS should be limited. 
 
 
 
 
